Handbook on Approval Voting (Studies in Choice and Welfare)
Product details
| Management number | 232066942 | Release Date | 2026/06/18 | List Price | US$54.98 | Model Number | 232066942 | ||
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to the Handbook on Approval Voting.- History of Approval Voting.- Acclamation Voting in Sparta: An Early Use of Approval Voting.- Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting.- Axiomatic Theory.- Collective Choice for Simple Preferences.- Axiomatizations of Approval Voting.- Committees.- Approval Balloting for Multi-winner Elections.- Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate's Will?.- Strategic Voting.- The Basic Approval Voting Game.- Approval Voting in Large Electorates.- Computational Aspects of Approval Voting.- Probabilistic Exercises.- On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives.- Behavioral Heterogeneity Under Approval and Plurality Voting.- In Silico Voting Experiments.- Experiments.- Laboratory Experiments on Approval Voting.- Framed Field Experiments on Approval Voting: Lessons from the 2002 and 2007 French Presidential Elections.- Approval Voting in Germany: Description of a Field Experiment.- Electoral Competition.- Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting.- Policy Moderation and Endogenous Candidacy in Approval Voting Elections.- Meaning for Individual and Society.- Describing Society Through Approval Data.- Approval as an Intrinsic Part of Preference. Read more
| ISBN10 | 3642028381 |
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| ISBN13 | 978-3642028380 |
| Edition | 2010th |
| Language | English |
| Publisher | Springer |
| Dimensions | 6.38 x 1.32 x 9.45 inches |
| Item Weight | 1.85 pounds |
| Print length | 500 pages |
| Publication date | July 25, 2010 |
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